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CASTING PEARLS BEFORE SWINE: WHY THE PUBLIC’S
DARLING RIGHT TO POLLUTE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
OVERTURNED IN RECENT SCOVA DECISION
THUMMIM PARK*

INTRODUCTION
The oyster has had a long and complicated history with Virginia’s
waters.1 Many towns and cities along the Nansemond River once knew
a time, decades past, when their oysters were some of the best around.2
Now, few people know the taste of a Nansemond River oyster.3 Throughout the years, oyster farmers in Virginia have become all too familiar
with the periodic closures of the river to farmers. These closures usually
follow the State Health Commissioner’s assessment that the river quality
has degraded so much that any oysters grown along the beds would be
unsafe to eat.4 And as oyster farmers struggled to farm quality shellfish
in the Nansemond River, they struggled, too, to gain any sort of recompense from the state officials causing those very same polluted waters.5
The Court’s opinion from a case decided over one hundred years
ago marked the beginning of this struggle.6 In Darling v. City of Newport
*
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1
See generally David M. Shulte, History of the Virginia Oyster Fishery, Chesapeake Bay,
USA, FRONTIERS IN MARINE SCI., May 9, 2017.
2
See Patricia Keppel, Everything You Need to Know About Virginia’s Oysters, VA.’S TRAVEL
BLOG (Feb. 1, 2022), https://blog.virginia.org/2016/08/virginia-oysters/ [https://perma.cc
/SC4C-8CFM].
3
Cf. id. (stating how pollution in the mid-twentieth century has made oysters rare and inedible around the Virginia area and work has recently begun only around the Chesapeake
Bay area to reduce such effects of pollution).
4
See VA. CODE ANN. § 28.2-803 (West) (tasking the State Health Commissioner with
analyzing the water and sediment qualities near oyster grounds for signs of pollution);
Johnson v. City of Suffolk, 851 S.E.2d 478, 483–84 (Va. 2020) (showing how the statutes
explicitly contemplate and plan for the condemnation of oyster beds following a finding
of unsafe levels of pollution or sanitary conditions).
5
See infra Parts II–IV.
6
See Darling v. City of Newport News, 96 S.E. 307, 307 (Va. 1918).
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News, oyster farmers in Newport News brought suit against the city for
disposing of wastewater directly into the James River.7 The Petitioners alleged the city’s actions were polluting the waters and damaging the farmers’ oysters.8 The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled in that case that the
oyster farmers were not due “just compensation” as a taking,9 because
the State had a right to pollute, superior to any alleged rights of the
oyster farmers.10 This ruling was further affirmed by the Supreme Court
of the United States11 and has since been duly upheld by the lower courts
of Virginia.12
The Supreme Court of Virginia was again recently faced with an
issue that was strikingly similar to that in Darling in Johnson v. City of
Suffolk, wherein oyster farmers brought another takings claim against
the city for the damage caused by the polluted waters of the Nansemond
River to their oysters.13 Plaintiffs argued that the court should overturn
the public’s superior right to pollute established by Virginia case law, set
out in Darling.14 A case decided at the turn of the century, it acknowledges
that “[w]hatever science may accomplish in the future we are not aware
that it yet has discovered any generally accepted way of avoiding the
practical necessity of so using the great natural purifying basin [referring
to the ocean].”15
With an almost ironically clear reference to the court’s lack of scientific understanding of their actions’ consequences at the time, it seemed
a clear answer that the case should have been overturned.16 However, the
court, in affirming the lower court’s decision to grant the Defendants’ demurrer,17 casually sidestepped the issue of whether or not the “Darling
7

See id.
See id.
9
See generally VA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (“No private property shall be damaged or taken
for public use without just compensation to the owner thereof.”).
10
See Darling, 96 S.E. at 309.
11
Darling v. City of Newport News, 249 U.S. 540, 543–44 (1919).
12
See infra Part IV.
13
Darling, 249 U.S. at 543–44; Johnson v. City of Suffolk, 851 S.E.2d 478, 480 (Va. 2020).
14
See Brief of Appellants at 11, Johnson, 851 S.E.2d (No. 191563).
15
Darling, 249 U.S. at 542–43.
16
See id.
17
A demurrer is “[a] pleading stating that although the facts alleged in a complaint may
be true, they are insufficient for the plaintiff to state a claim for relief and for the
defendant to frame an answer.” Demurrer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
More often called a “motion to dismiss” in most jurisdictions, Virginia is one of the few
states who still use this term in legal proceedings. See Lee E. Berlik, Motions Craving
Oyer in Virginia, VA. BUS. LITIG. BLOG (May 16, 2020), https://www.virginiabusinesslitiga
tionlawyer.com/motions-craving-oyer-in-virginia/ [https://perma.cc/6SU4-G2AG].
8
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right” was still good case law. The court decided instead to center its dismissal on the farmers’ property rights.18 In one fell swoop, the oyster
farmers of the Nansemond River were denied just compensation and cities
were allowed to continue raising this archaic defense.19 This Note will
use Johnson v. City of Suffolk as a case study and illustrative example
of why the municipality’s argument using Darling, alleging its superior
public right to pollute, should have been overturned given an evaluation
of similar cases following Darling, changed regulations, and evolved understandings of the Court’s rationale.
This Note calls for the Virginia Supreme Court to recognize that
a city’s right to freely pollute the public waterways is no longer valid
under the Virginia Constitution, and to recognize that the line of Darling
cases granting municipalities the public right to pollute waterways should
have been overturned.
Part I will set out the foundation for this Note.20 It will discuss the
background of Johnson v. City of Suffolk, laying the context for this Note’s
discussion.21 Part II will engage in an analysis of the rationale for Darling.
It will contextualize and compare it to current understandings of the relevant doctrines.22 Part III will then assess how courts applied the Darling
right in cases in light of changed environmental regulations and statutes.23
Lastly, Part IV will analyze Johnson, and discuss how the Darling right
should have been applied, as opposed to how it was in fact applied.24
I.

CONTEXT AND THE JOHNSON CASE

Recently decided by the Virginia Supreme Court is Johnson v.
City of Suffolk, a case with several striking similarities to the original
Darling case with aggrieved oyster farmers seeking remedies for damage
caused by a city allowing untreated sewage to flow into a local river.25 In
Johnson, Petitioners leased their oyster-farming grounds along the bed
of the Nansemond River from Defendant City of Suffolk pursuant to
Virginia statute.26 Petitioners brought their claim against the city and
18

See Johnson, 851 S.E.2d at 483.
See id. at 480.
20
Infra Part I.
21
See infra Part I.
22
Infra Part II.
23
Infra Part III.
24
Infra Part IV.
25
Johnson v. City of Suffolk, 851 S.E.2d 478, 480 (Va. 2020).
26
See VA. CODE ANN. § 28.2-603 (West); Petition for Declaratory Judgment at 7, Johnson,
851 S.E.2d (No. 191563).
19
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Defendant Hampton Roads Sanitation District (“HRSD”) who jointly operate Suffolk’s sewage waste system.27 The wastewater system was designed to, at times, allow untreated sewage overflow into the Nansemond
River, damaging Petitioners’ oysters.28
Petitioners’ appeal rested on two main arguments: first, the trial
court erroneously focused on federal case law applying the United States
Constitution because the Petitioners’ claim was based on the Virginia
Constitution; and second, the trial court erroneously relied on obsolete
case law in deciding that the city had a right to pollute, and that it did not
owe Petitioners just compensation.29 This Note will focus on the second of
these arguments, much as the Supreme Court of Virginia did.30 Defendants
in response argued that they cannot be held liable, relying heavily on
Darling.31 Defendants alleged that the right of the public to use rivers to
discharge sewers is superior to oyster farmers’ rights to their property.32
However, despite the fact that all parties seemed to focus mainly
on the question of whether or not Darling was still good law, the Supreme
Court of Virginia decided to turn its decision on how the oyster farmers’
property rights were to be characterized.33 Focusing on the limited property interests of the oyster farmers,34 the court was able to distinguish
Plaintiffs’ property rights from those of other cases’ plaintiffs, wherein
the court held that the state actors would be required to pay just compensation.35 The court acknowledged the changes in federal and state environmental laws, but declined to comment further on the argument.36
Instead, the opinion pivoted sharply to focus on the scope of the oyster
farmers’ property rights and whether or not the state is subject to statutory
just compensation requirements only in that respect.37
The court went on to say that there was no legal justification to
the argument that the oyster farmers as mere lessees of the river beds
were owed clean water. As such, the Defendants’ actions were not subject
27

Petition for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 26, at 7.
Id. at 7–8.
29
See Brief of Appellants, supra note 14, at 2.
30
Johnson, 851 S.E.2d at 481.
31
See generally Appellee Brief of Hampton Roads Sanitation Dist., Johnson, 851 S.E.2d
(No. 191563).
32
See id. at 19.
33
See generally Johnson, 851 S.E.2d (focusing eight out of eleven pages of the opinion on
characterizing the limited property interest of the oyster farmers).
34
This will be discussed in Section II.A, infra.
35
See Johnson, 851 S.E.2d at 484.
36
See id. at 483.
37
Id.
28
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to consequence.38 The court points to the existence of state statutes outlining a process for river closures or relief from rent payments due to such
events following findings of unsafe levels of pollution or other unsanitary
conditions.39 The court reasons that because the state planned for the
possibility of polluted waters, and polluted waters have been a problem
faced by oyster farmers for centuries, this enables the city to continue to
purposefully, or negligently, allow untreated wastewater to flow into the
Nansemond River.40 In other words, because the oyster farmers chose such
land to grow their oysters, they assumed the risk of polluted waters, which
then allows the city to pollute those waters without compensating the
farmers for any resulting harm.41
In a classically indulgent rationale, Suffolk was allowed to continue its deplorable actions because that is how it has always been done.42
In this way, the court again relied upon and upheld the city’s “Darling
right” to pollute. The city was allowed to continue negligently discharging
its wastewaters into the Nansemond River that flows around it.
II.

THE DARLING RATIONALE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIRGINIA’S
TAKINGS CASE LAW

As will be discussed later, this Note argues that the rationale upon
which both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme
Court of Virginia base their decisions for Darling is no longer applicable
in the modern context.43 The courts, in both of their opinions, affirmed
the superiority of the public’s right to pollute based partly on the understanding at the time that lessees of oyster farming grounds held property
rights that were very strictly limited to exclude the water above the river
beds, as well as the quality of the water.44 This Part will explain the doctrine and rationale behind the Darling decisions. It will further explain
how the current understandings evolved over time due to a change in the
understanding of implied rights through leases to farm and harvest oysters,
38

Id. at 483–44.
See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 28.2-803–807 (West 2022).
40
See Johnson, 851 S.E.2d at 484.
41
See id.
42
A commonly expressed criticism of stare decisis is the worry that it may create legal
inertia, preventing courts from adapting appropriately to changing social values and norms.
See Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 538 (2008).
43
See infra Part IV.
44
See Darling v. City of Newport News, 96 S.E. 307, 310 (Va. 1918); Darling v. City of
Newport News, 249 U.S. 540, 543–44 (1919).
39
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as well as a broader interpretation of the “damaged or taken” requirement
in the Virginia Constitution following since-enacted legislation.45
A.

Characterization of Private Property Rights

In Virginia, property for eminent domain proceedings is defined
as “land and personal property, and any right, title, interest, estate or claim
in or to such property.”46 The Court has held that any takings action must
first meet the threshold requirement that the plaintiffs have a legally
cognizable property interest, under either the Virginia Constitution or
United States Constitution.47 This is because for plaintiffs to allege that
they are due just compensation, they must first show that there has been
a dislocation of a specific right within the owner’s “bundle of rights.”48
An owner’s property rights are often characterized by legal scholars
and practitioners as a “bundle of sticks.”49 These so-called sticks include
rights such as possession, future interest, use, use of the property only
in certain ways, and more.50 Having the “full bundle of sticks” is referred
to as having a “fee simple” interest in the property.51 Following this analogy, only certain sticks potentially within a person’s ownership are protected by the Fifth Amendment.52
This has implications that could go either way for a potential
plaintiff of an inverse condemnation action—a person does not need the full
bundle of sticks to be owed just compensation, nor does a person having
some property interests mean they are necessarily due just compensation.53

45

See VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
VA. CODE ANN. § 25.1-100 (2018).
47
See Johnson v. City of Suffolk, 851 S.E.2d 478, 481 (Va. 2020); Va. Const. art. I, § 11;
U.S. Const. amend. V. See also Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 806 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (“[U]nder our regulatory takings analysis . . . the threshold question is
‘whether the claimant has established a “property interest” for the purposes of the Fifth
Amendment.’”) (citations omitted); Air Pegasus of D.C. Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d
1206, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating that before considering whether or not a taking has
occurred, a cognizable property interest must first be identified).
48
See Byler v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 731 S.E.2d 916, 921 (Va. 2012).
49
Kristine S. Tardiff, Analyzing Every Stick in the Bundle: Why the Examination of a
Claimant’s Property Interests Is the Most Important Inquiry in Every Fifth Amendment
Takings Case, 54 FED. LAW. 30, 31 (2007).
50
See id.
51
See Matter of Kansas Star Casino, L.L.C., No. 121,469, 2021 WL 2021829, at *14 (Kan.
Ct. App. May 21, 2021) (“The fee simple interest of real estate consists of every stick in
the bundle of rights.”).
52
See Tardiff, supra note 49, at 31.
53
See id. However, it is also important to note that the oyster farmers’ case may have
46
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In Johnson, the court pointed to statutory provisions that have
historically limited the property interests of oyster farmers in Virginia.54
The court pointed to the language used in Darling:
[T]he lease is made only “for the purpose of planting and
propagating oysters thereon,” and it is for this purpose
alone that the planter is authorized to use and occupy
such ground, that is to say, that while any citizen might
have taken oysters therefrom before the grant, afterwards
he only may do so, and all others are excluded from either
planting or taking oysters from such ground during his
term. This marks the limit of his right, for there is nothing
to indicate that any other public or private right is withdrawn, limited, or curtailed.55
The court held that because the river beds are leased from the
state, the oyster farmers do not have fee simple title over the river beds,
and instead have only the right to farm oysters upon them.56 As leaseholders, only their oysters were considered Plaintiffs’ personal property
by fee simple, which would be due just compensation if taken or damaged.57 Instead, the oyster farmers’ property rights were to be construed
strictly against them as the lessees and for the lessor, the state.58 Accordingly, their rights were limited strictly to what is explicitly stated in the
statute, reserving every other right to the public.59

been an uphill battle from the beginning, as the riparian context tips the balancing test
for takings claims against the plaintiffs.
[T]he nature of riparian rights makes it difficult for private parties to
prevail in a takings claim. In cases when courts do find that the government has taken a water right, it is usually the case that the entire right
was destroyed; it is exceedingly uncommon for a plaintiff to win a
takings case when the government has merely interfered with the
water right.
Noah D. Hall & Benjamin C. Houston, Law and Governance of the Great Lakes, 63
DEPAUL L. REV. 723, 765 (2014).
54
Johnson v. City of Suffolk, 851 S.E.2d 478, 482 (Va. 2020).
55
Id. at 483 (quoting Darling v. City of Newport News, 96 S.E. 307, 308 (Va. 1918)).
56
See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
57
Town of Cape Charles v. Ballard Bros. Fish Co., 107 S.E.2d 436, 440 (Va. 1959).
58
See Working Waterman’s Ass’n v. Seafood Harvesters, Inc., 314 S.E.2d 159, 165 (Va.
1984) (citing Darling, 96 S.E. at 308).
59
Id.
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Jus Publicum

Similarly, common law understanding of the public trust at the
time would have stated that oyster farmers have a limited property interest being only lessees of the riverbed instead of fee simple title holders.
Accordingly, this meant they would be “subject to the ancient right of the
riparian owners to drain the harmful refuse of the land into the sea.”60
The jus publicum, or public trust, is understood as a form of property
interests reserved for the state arising from the state’s sovereignty and
its duty to serve the public’s interest by limiting private property interests.61 Legal doctrine and Virginia case law indicate that although relatively few public uses are included in this reserved list of jus publicum,
one commonly acknowledged right is the right to dispose of wastewater
into rivers.62 Accordingly, though plaintiffs may lease the river beds and
have fee simple title to the oysters themselves, the court held that the river
beds, the water above the beds, and the waters themselves “are owned
and controlled by the state, for the use and benefit of all the public . . . .”
The Supreme Court of Virginia interpreted the latter part to include the
right to direct the flow of untreated wastewater into the river.63
“[T]he oyster planter takes his right to plant and propagate oysters
on the public domain of the Commonwealth in the tidal waters . . . .”64
However, the Supreme Court of Virginia in previous cases has ruled that
oyster bed leases, among other riverbed leases for the purpose of farming,
convey rights by necessary implication, which would necessarily include
the right to harvest.65 This is the common law understanding of riparian
rights and the nature of the public trust upon which the Supreme Court’s
decision in Darling was based. Other cases have similarly affirmed the superiority of the public’s right to “lawful pollution . . . for sewage disposal.”66
However, some legal scholars have provided arguments as to why
the public’s right to pollute should be excluded from the jus publicum.67
60

Darling, 96 S.E. at 309.
Lynda L. Butler, The Commons Concept: An Historical Concept with Modern Relevance,
23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 835, 916 (1982).
62
Id.
63
Darling, 96 S.E. at 307.
64
Id. at 309.
65
Working Waterman’s Ass’n v. Seafood Harvesters, Inc., 314 S.E.2d 159, 164–65 (Va. 1984).
66
Ancarrow v. Richmond, 600 F.2d 443, 446 (4th Cir. 1979).
67
Robin Kundis Craig, Defining Riparian Rights As “Property” Through Takings Litigation:
Is There A Property Right to Environmental Quality?, 42 ENV’T L. 115, 153 (2012).
61
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One such idea points to the claim, successfully pled in some cases in other
jurisdictions, that public property rights should include the right to a
property interest in a certain minimum level of environmental or water
quality.68 In those cases, the court held that a state water law held an
important role in defining the property interest at issue to find that a
physical taking had taken place.69 Notably, there is underdeveloped but
existing case law, especially in some eastern states, recognizing the right
to access to water of a certain quality.70 North Carolina has even explicitly stated the riparian owners’ right to “undiminished and unimpaired
[] quality” of water.71
Although too few and far between to call a trend, these instances
of courts recognizing the importance of maintaining water of a certain
quality should be noted as a reflection of the change in public opinion
and understanding of wastewater disposal since Darling.
C.

Statutory Changes and Scientific Understandings

It is also important to note that the public right to pollute is not
limitless, which is clearly acknowledged in the opinion of the Darling
case itself.72 The Supreme Court clarified that not all pollution is permissible according to Darling—only that which does not “create a nuisance
that so seriously interfere[s] with private property as to infringe Constitutional rights.”73 The opinion also conditioned the decision on the scientific understandings of the effects of discarding sewage disposal into
68
See id.; see, e.g., International Paper, Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 407–08 (1931);
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 614, 616 (1963); Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District
v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 314, 324 n.7 (Fed. Cl. 2001); Casitas Municipal Water
District v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
69
Craig, supra note 67, at 127.
70
See, e.g., Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 234 A.2d 825, 831 (Conn. 1967); Montelious
v. Elsea, 161 N.E.2d 675, 678 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1959); Harrell v. City of Conway, 271 S.W.2d
924, 926 (Ark. 1954); Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Zeitler, 24 A.2d 788, 790 (Md. 1942);
Fackler v. Cincinnati N.O. & T.P. Co., 17 S.W.2d 194, 195 (Ky. Ct. App. 1929); Smith v. Town
of Morganton, 123 S.E. 88, 89 (N.C. 1924); Johns v. City of Platteville, 157 N.W. 761, 761
(Wis. 1916) (quoting Winchell v. City of Waukesha, 85 N.W. 668, 670 (Wis. 1901)); Mills
Power Co. v. Mohawk Hydro-Electric Co., 140 N.Y.S. 655, 656 (N.Y. App. Div. 1913).
71
See L & S Water Power, Inc. v. Piedmont Triad Reg’l Water Auth., 712 S.E.2d 146, 150
(N.C. Ct. App. 2011); see also Coastal Plains Utils., Inc. v. New Hanover Cnty., 601
S.E.2d 915, 927 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). Contra Biddix v. Henredon Furniture Indus., Inc.,
331 S.E.2d 717, 721 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (allowing for “diminution in the quantity and
quality of a watercourse that is consistent with the beneficial use of the land”).
72
See Darling v. City of Newport News, 249 U.S. 540, 542–43 (1919).
73
Id. at 543.
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public waters held by the court at the turn of the twentieth century.74
More recent cases tackling the issue of states’ right to pollute have acknowledged the various changes in scientific understandings, as well as
federal laws, since Darling was decided over one hundred years ago.75 A
major point on which the Darling courts’ decisions turned was the lack
of explicit legislative intent at the time to limit the state’s ability to convey its right to pollute its waters to the municipalities.76 The Virginia
court specifically stated that the decision is based, in part, on the fact that
one could not have assumed, at the time, that the legislature intended to
limit the public’s common law right to pollute due to the absence of a
“clear and explicit statute indicating such purpose.”77
Several statutes have been enacted, both at the state and federal
levels, since the Darling cases were decided, thereby invalidated that leg
of the court’s rationale.78 It is especially important to note here, therefore,
that a “validly enacted federal law can, of course, preempt any state law,
including a provision of a state constitution in proper instances.”79 The
Virginia Constitution tasks the Commonwealth with protecting its environment for the general welfare of its people, to allow the people to
have “clean air” and “pure water.”80 Section 21-218 of the Virginia Code
further explicitly prohibits the discharge of any sewage into the waters
of Virginia.81 It specifies that neither city nor other public body shall be
allowed to pollute the waters in such a way.82 Virginia Code Sections
62.1-44.4(1) and 62.1-44.3(1) also prohibit the state or any of its subdivisions from the right to discharge waste into any state waters.83 Lastly,
Section 62.1-44.4 further prohibits any party from continuing any existing
74

See id. at 542–43.
See infra Part IV.
76
See Darling v. City of Newport News, 96 S.E. 307, 307, 308–09 (Va. 1918).
77
See id. at 308–09.
78
See VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“Further, it shall be the Commonwealth’s policy to protect
its atmosphere, lands, and waters from pollution, impairment, or destruction, for the
benefit, enjoyment, and general welfare of the people of the Commonwealth.”); see also
33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (West).
79
Stoddard v. Western Carolina Regional Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200, 1207 (4th Cir. 1986)
(ruling the riparian landowners were entitled to recover costs).
80
See VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
81
See VA. CODE ANN. § 21-218 (West) (“No county, city, town or other public body, or
person shall discharge, or suffer to be discharged, directly or indirectly into any tidal
waters of the district any sewage, industrial wastes or other refuse which may or will
cause or contribute to pollution of any tidal waters of the district.”).
82
Id.
83
See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.4, 62.1-44.3 (West 2022); Wilson v. United States, 425 F.
Supp. 143, 144 (E.D. Va. 1977).
75
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degradation of state water quality.84 It explicitly precludes any claim to
have acquired a right to continue degrading state water quality by past
discharge of wastewaters through past discharges.85
Other courts have also considered the effects of federal legislation
on the common law doctrine, specifically following the enactment of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (hereinafter “Clean Water Act” or
“CWA”).86 Specifically, the Fourth Circuit in Stoddard v. Western Carolina
Regional Sewer Authority87 found that the cases such as Darling which
affirm the public’s right to pollute are no longer valid in the case of sewage
disposal into navigable waters, when harm is inflicted on private property owners.88 The court in that case stated that although the discharge
of sewage can still be a legitimate practice of the government’s police
power in some limited circumstances, the Clean Water Act “imposes a
severe limitation on the right to discharge sewage or other pollutants
into the nation’s waterways.”89
These statutes are very clearly attempts by both the federal and
state legislatures aimed to strictly prohibit the Commonwealth or other
states from contaminating waters with sewage.90 This extends to preventing them from conveying that right to municipalities or other publicly owned or operated facilities, such as wastewater treatment plants.91
The self-imposed limits on the public’s right to pollute by the
Darling courts also has to be re-examined from a more modern lens following the changed legislations.92 The Clean Water Act was enacted in
response to growing public awareness and concerns about water pollution.93 These concerns were the result of increases in knowledge and
scientific understanding of the effects of discharging sewage into waterways.94 Although many uncertainties about several technical aspects of
the Clean Water Act enforcement remain, the legislature felt there was
now sufficient scientific understanding to enact a statutory scheme
84

See VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.4 (West 2022).
See id.
86
See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (West 2022).
87
Stoddard v. Western Carolina Regional Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200, 1205 (4th Cir. 1986).
88
See id.; infra Part III.
89
See Stoddard, 784 F.2d at 1205.
90
See Darling v. City of Newport News, 96 S.E. 307, 308–09 (Va. 1918).
91
See id.
92
Darling v. City of Newport News, 249 U.S. 540, 542–43 (1919).
93
See HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations
/history-clean-water-act [https://perma.cc/5KR9-Y7CV] (last updated May 27, 2021).
94
See id.
85
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aimed to address the problems currently and potentially posed by continued water pollution.95
Further, the discharge of wastewater overflows into public waterways now has more significant impacts on water quality and environmental degradation than it did one hundred years ago, when Darling was
decided.96 This is due to the different contaminants in the wastewaters,
which now include industrial wastes, chemicals, stormwater run-off, and
other, more harmful pollutants.97 The Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) has acknowledged that sewer run-off and wastewater systems
designed to allow overflow into waterways pose significant risks to
health, aquatic life, water habitability, and general usability.98 There are
studies that have recognized that sewer run-off is a major source of water
pollution.99
Although Petitioners’ rights are limited as leaseholders of public
riverbeds, Defendants’ so-called right to pollute into Nansemond River
should not make Petitioners ineligible for just compensation for damage
to their oysters.100 The limits of the rationale of the Darling decision
itself and modern peremptory federal statutes no longer support Defendants’ arguments about the superiority of the public’s right to pollute,
especially at the cost of damage to private property.101
III.

FURTHER CONSIDERATION IN CASES OF COMMON LAW RIGHT OF
PUBLIC TO POLLUTE

Several municipalities across the United States, and especially
around coastal Virginia, have been brought to court by aggrieved private
parties since Darling was decided at the turn of the century.102 These plaintiffs, as will be discussed below, have generally argued that cities should
not be allowed to continue to pollute public waters with untreated sewage.103 Although the states’ pollution was clearly to the detriment of the
surrounding populations, the municipalities still somehow claimed it was
95
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justified as a police power for the benefit of the public.104 Unfortunately,
the majority of these cases have not been decided in favor of the private
plaintiffs.105 Even in cases where the plaintiffs were awarded damages,
the courts have upheld the “Darling right” by distinguishing those cases
from previous case law.106 This section will analyze how the Darling
cases have been interpreted and applied in subsequent cases regarding
municipalities’ public right to pollute.107 It will explain how, and why,
these subsequent cases can or should no longer be applied now.108
A.

Du Pont Rayon Co. v. Richmond Industries, Inc.

Du Pont was a case appealing from the District Court of the United
States for the Eastern District of Virginia.109 The Plaintiff, Du Pont Rayon
Co. (“Du Pont”), a large rayon and cellophane manufacturing company,
brought suit to enjoin Defendant, Richmond Industries, from discharging
the dye waste from its large plant into the James River.110 While the
wastewater was not discharged directly through the sewers of the City
of Richmond, the Defendant was connected to the city water lines and
admitted that its purpose was to discharge its wastewater through the
city, which would come to flow through Du Pont’s plant.111
The court acknowledged the existence of a general right of the
public to make reasonable use of the water, but that this right is subject
to the jus publicum.112 As such, the court stated, the right of the public
to pollute and dispose of sewage water is superior to the private property
right in the waters.113 The court made this decision, emphasizing that a
municipal corporation has the right to use the waters for the purpose of
discharging its wastes, because the use of tidal waters for the discharge
of sewage is unquestionably a public use.114
The court seemed to expand its reasoning to reach across any
property rights in the riverbeds, stating that “the mere ownership of a
104
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tract of land under the salt water would not be enough . . . to give a right
to prevent the fouling of the water as supposed.”115 Important to note in
the opinion, is that the court again seems to condition the holding on the
currently existing laws and legislative intent at the time.116
The opinion shows a dated way of thinking about the issues presented in the case in several ways. First, the court stated that there is
“nothing unreasonable” in a city allowing the free discharge of industrial
wastes into city water lines, without any consideration of the effects on
human health and surrounding animal life.117 The court demonstrated its
lack of scientific understanding about the effects of discharging wastewaters into public waterways in this manner, as acknowledged by the
court in Darling.118
The court also stated its policy for coming to this holding: “for it
is clear under the law of Virginia that neither the public health nor the
industrial development of its tidewater cities, both of which are dependent upon sewage disposal, can be subordinated to the rights of a riparian
owner to make use of public waters for private purposes.”119 Again, this
justification no longer holds in current law because of statutes enacted
after Du Pont that demonstrate a clear intent by the federal and Virginia
legislatures to prioritize human health and environmental quality by
minimizing the pollution of waters.120
B.

Ancarrow v. City of Richmond

In this case, Plaintiffs were private property owners of a marina
who filed suit against the City of Richmond for the city’s continued
pollution of the James River.121 The city operated a sewage treatment
plant located near the Plaintiffs’ property.122 Plaintiffs alleged that the
pollution rendered their property valueless, and as such entitled them to
damages as a taking under the Fourteenth Amendment.123 The circuit
115
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court judge held that the superior public right to pollute was applicable
for the City of Richmond in this case, relying mainly on Du Pont,124 and
decided for Richmond.125
Plaintiffs argued that Du Pont was no longer controlling due to
changes in Virginia law which occurred after Du Pont was decided.126 In
that way, Plaintiffs attempted to extend the argument by claiming that
the new statutory limitations on the public’s right to pollute would give
Plaintiffs a new right superior to that of the public.127
Unfortunately, the point the court focused on, and the point on
which the Darling question ultimately turns, was the second portion of
the argument—that the Plaintiffs had a new riparian right by implication.128 The court denied what is, admittedly, the clearly attenuated
argument that the statute grants a new riparian right to private property owners but declines to discuss any further the possible effects of the
newly enacted statutes on the right to pollute.129
This lack of consideration is unfortunate because the court itself
referred to the statute whose plain language, on its face, would make the
City of Richmond’s actions an unlawful pollution of the James River.130
Further consideration of this issue may have also shown multiple statutes enacted to further demonstrate the General Assembly’s clear intent
to prevent the Commonwealth from allowing the discharge of untreated
sewage and other harmful wastewater into public waters, as discussed
earlier in this Note.131
This case takes the same unfortunate turn as Johnson v. City of
Suffolk will, over forty years later. The court focused on the characterization of the plaintiff’s property rights rather than the validity of the Darling
right asserted by the defendants.132
124
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Stoddard v. Western Carolina Regional Sewer Authority

In this case, riparian landowners brought suit against the Western
Carolina Regional Sewer Authority (“Sewer Authority”), alleging property damage and devaluation caused by Sewer Authority’s discharge of
sewage onto Plaintiffs’ property.133 The trial court found that there had
been a taking, due to the conditions caused on the Plaintiffs’ property by
the sewage discharge.134 The Sewer Authority, on appeal, argued that it
should not be held liable for damages to the Plaintiffs’ property.135 It argued that its sewage discharge was a legitimate exercise of its police
power, and there was therefore no “taking” that had occurred.136
In arguing against the trial court’s decision, Sewer Authority
relied heavily on the common law public’s superior right to pollute.137 The
court conceded that a discharge of sewage could be, at times, a legitimate
exercise of police power.138 However, this court placed a heavier emphasis
on the existence of the Clean Water Act, and the effects of the changed
regulation.139 The court engages in a discussion on the standards of
preemption of federal-state legislations:
A validly enacted federal law can, of course, preempt any
state law, including a provision of a state constitution in
proper instances. . . . Before the Supreme Court finds that
state law has been preempted, however, a clear and manifest congressional purpose must be found . . . . The [Clean
Water] Act specifically provides that pollution be controlled by state law if that law satisfies the federal act.
South Carolina has adopted just such a statute, the South
Carolina Pollution Control Act.140

is superior to a city’s state-regulated right to lawfully pollute public waters.”) (internal
citations omitted).
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The court also spoke to the nuisance limitation mentioned in by the
Darling court.141 The court stated that “‘a governmental body, although
otherwise immune from liability, loses that immunity if the danger which
caused the harm is in fact a nuisance.’”142 The court stated that a party
could recover damages from the state if the government body does cause
a nuisance that interferes with a private property interest.143
This case demonstrates an unfortunately uncommon example of
a court giving the Clean Water Act due consideration in the discussion
of a takings case, instead of inordinately focusing on the characterization
of property rights.144
IV.

ASSESSMENT OF THE JOHNSON CASE WITH AN UPDATED
PERSPECTIVE ON DARLING

The rationales that the courts in the cases above145 relied upon are
echoed in the opinion for the Supreme Court of Virginia’s Johnson v. City
of Suffolk.146 The court focused and decided the case on one main aspect
of Plaintiffs’ appeal. Plaintiffs argued that the trial court should not have
relied on obsolete case law in deciding that the city had a right to pollute
and did not owe Petitioners just compensation.147 Defendants in response
argued that they could not be held liable, relying heavily on Darling, alleging the right of the public to use rivers to discharge sewers is superior
to oyster farmers’ rights to their property. 148 Both Plaintiffs and Defendants focused most of their pleadings and court briefs on the question of
whether or not Darling was still good law. Despite this, again, as seen in
both Du Pont and Ancarrow, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided to
turn its decision on the characterization of the farmers’ property interests in the riverbeds.149
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The court focused on the statutes that granted the city the authority to lease, and only lease, the riverbeds to farmers for the purpose of
farming oysters and other shellfish.150 The court then used this limited
characterization of the oyster farmers’ property interests to hold that no
taking had occurred, for no property interest had been dislocated.151 The
court was also able to use this limited scope of property interests to distinguish Plaintiffs’ property rights from other plaintiffs in cases where
the court had found a taking had indeed occurred.152
The court only shortly acknowledged the changes in federal and
state environmental law and declined to discuss any further implications
of it.153 The court conceded only that Plaintiffs were correct in asserting
that many changes had occurred in the statutory landscape since Darling
had been decided.154 Instead, the court again pivoted to place the focus
back onto the discussion on the scope of the oyster farmers’ property rights,
and in doing so, upheld the obsolete and archaic law of Darling, not even
considering the limitations considered by the court back in 1919.155
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Virginia should have followed the rationale
that Stoddard court took.156 The Supreme Court of Virginia should have
instead considered the implications of such regulations on the legality of
Defendants’ actions in negligently allowing untreated sewage to flow into
the waters above Plaintiffs’ oysters.157 Stoddard’s discussion was more
holistic in its consideration of the issue at hand and properly considered
the changes in not only the legal landscape, but of environmental science,
the understanding of the public trust, and the idea of the public’s right
to clean water.158
Instead, the court went on to say there was no sound justification
to Plaintiffs’ arguments that the oyster farmers were owed clean water,
150
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simply because they are lessees of the riverbeds.159 The court looked to
the existence of state statutes outlining processes in the case of unsanitary conditions and river closures to justify that the Plaintiffs are not
owed clean water.160 The court erroneously assumes that because the
oyster farmers entered into the leasehold knowing the state planned for
the possibility of polluted waters, it enables the city to continue to purposefully, or negligently, allow untreated wastewater to flow into the
Nansemond River.161 This assumption, however, conveniently ignores the
original intent of the legislators in drafting the statute that specifically
reserves the fee simple interest to the state, and only the state.162 The
intent of the statute, and the origin of the public trust doctrine, show that
these reserved rights are a duty for state use to serve and for the benefit
of the public.163 Instead, the court uses the existence of precautionary
statutes as an excuse to allow the city to continue discharging wastewater
into the Nansemond River, damaging not only the farmers’ oysters, but
the health and welfare of its residents as well. And so, the court again
upheld the city’s “Darling right” to pollute and sheltered the city from
the consequences of its environmentally degrading actions.164
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